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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Afghan Government has been ranked one of the most corrupted system in recent 
years and after more than one decade of international aid on strengthening 
government institutions; this problem is still existed and even growing up. Both 
Afghan government and International community spent millions of dollars either 
through governmental reform activities or NGOs’ projects to fight against corruption, 
but most of these projects didn’t work out or had a very small impact.  
This paper is analyzing the major government and international community efforts 
to combat corruption from 2002 till 2014, and will focus on two approaches of 
fighting it, which are prevention and sanction. And by analyzing of different 
established institutions, policies, strategies and projects, it is going to argue that if 
Prevention and Sanction approaches were addressed properly, level of corruption 
was decreased. 
 
Statement of problem;  
 
The Afghan Government has been ranked as one of the most corrupted systems in 
recent years and after more than one decade of international aid on strengthening 
government institution; this problem still exists and is even increasing.  
Both the Afghan government and the international community spent millions of 
dollars either through governmental reform activities or NGOs’ projects to fight 
against corruption, but most of these projects didn’t work out or had a very small 
impact.  
8
A 2010 UN Survey shows that 72% of Afghan interviewees believe that it is necessary 
to pay bribes to be able to access public service and at same time 63% of them 
believe it is not effective to report corruption, since nothing is going to be done 
about it.1 It also pointed out that the court system, police, customs and taxes, 
identity cards and passports, land, electricity and transport as well as higher 
education are respectively the most highly corrupt services in the country. 
Meanwhile some active international institutions such as The Asian Development 
Bank, have pointed out that corruption is part of behavior of officials by which they 
enrich themselves improperly and unlawfully and those who are close to them--or 
induce others to do so-- by misusing their position of power. And the Afghan 
President, Hamid Karzai echoed in his interview in January 2009 with BBC News that 
the Government of Afghanistan as well as International organizations, aid agencies 
and private sector firms are affected by corruption.2 
However, the Afghan government as a responsible party and the international 
community as the supporter, have addressed corruption through numerous 
commitments, strategies, policies and programs. Still, corruption in Afghanistan is 
known as one of top three problems and a major challenge for rule of law, 
governance, and sustainable economic growth. This paper is going to argue that the 
government of Afghanistan did not have proper sanction  approach which means 
endorsing laws and designing policies, and a prevention  approach that is 
                                                        
1 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime. Statistics and Surveys Section, 
Corruption in Afghanistan: bribery as reported by the victims, January 2010, 2 
Dec. 2010, p. 30, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption- survey2010-Eng.pdf. 
 
2 Steven A. Zyck, “Corruption and Anti Corruption issues in Afghanistan.”, Civil 
military fusion center, (2012): 44. 
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establishment of institutions, to fight corruption in the country. This lack of 
effectiveness is due to lack of capacity and commitment, corrupt networks inside the 
government and inappropriate policies and strategies. 
 
Purpose of the study: 
 
This study is focused on analyzing the outcome of anti corruption efforts in 
Afghanistan after the new regime which begun in 2002. This study will analyze 
different approaches taken by the Afghan government and their international 
counterparts in fighting corruption; but with special focus on two areas of sanction 
and prevention. The purpose of the study is to give a depth and comprehensive 
analysis of what went wrong through these years in combating corruption and what 
are the mean reasons that the efforts didn’t work.  
 
Significance of the study 
 
It will contribute to the general understanding of anti corruption efforts and how 
corruption could be decreased if the sanction and prevention approaches take place 
properly. This study will also give a depth analysis of why some model policies are 
will not be effective in every region and how every country specially the third world 
and post war countries have their own specific governmental characteristics that 
need to be strongly considered in designing policies and strategies.  Afghanistan case 
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study is one of the most crucial in last few decades and this thesis will help to have a 
better understanding of corruption and how to fight with it.   
 
Research Questions: 
 
To achieve the intended purpose of this study, It would answer to: 
o  Whether Afghan government and international community, 
implemented proper strategies and approaches to fight corruption in 
Afghanistan;  
o Whether if the Sanction and Prevention approaches reduced level of 
corruption in Afghanistan. 
o How Afghanistan case is different from other fragile states? 
 
Scope and Limitations 
 
Studying governmental affairs in Afghanistan has always been restricted by the 
bureaucratic government structure, lack of data, unwillingness to share information 
to the public. And this is broader when it comes to the issue of corruption. There are 
limited researches and reports about corruption in Afghanistan and mostly statistics 
are based on random researches that UN agencies, US Embassy or other 
international counterparts publishing once in a while. So this study is mostly relied 
on the data extracted from the reports and researched of mentioned agencies.   
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Distance is difficulty that the researcher of this study is facing, since due to 
immigration I wont live anymore in Afghanistan and mostly have done my 
researches online and on qualitative bases.  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Internationally there is not any concrete definition of corruption, but most common 
interpretation of corruption is abusing or misusing of public or trusted power for the 
personal gain. Further more some of anti-corruption affiliated organizations defined 
it based on different aspects. For instance journal of Systemic Practice and Action 
Research knows corruption generally as “ agent relationship, misuse of public 
offices…and violation of public interest.” Based on this article, corrupt character is 
defined not only the one who receive the bribe, but also the one who offer it in 
exchange for special treatment. Also the transparency international is defining 
corruption as “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” And this description is 
mostly accepted one.  
Other major international organization are having their own definition of corruption, 
even though there is the broad acceptance of what Transparency international 
defined.   For instance The Asian Development Bank (ADB), indicates that corruption 
is “ involvement of behavior in which officials -including those in private sector-
improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them—or induce 
others to do so—by misusing their position of power. 
Corruption brings economic instability and negative consequences in a long term. 
Investment in Afghanistan is affected by this lack of security in economy and high 
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level of corruption and bureaucracy within the governmental entities. Bentzen 
believes in deep analysis of the corruption and its causes. He emphasizes that the 
stakeholders should figure it out what should be fixed first; in the government or the 
society3. Corruption in Afghanistan flows in different layers of the government as 
well as the society and to fight it both Anti-Corruption organization plus the society 
need to recognize the priorities of the campaign. Corruption affects the economy 
more in the income distribution and increases the level of poor people in the society.  
In Afghanistan corruption has a huge impact on poor people since they receive low 
social services and corruption between the contractor and sub-contractors decrease 
the quality of development projects and communities specially in rural area benefits 
from much lower quality project than what it intended to be.  
“Afghanistan is at a pivotal moment, decades of instability, warfare, and future of 
this war torn county relies on today’s policies and initiatives…education may be the 
most vital of these policies and initiatives”4. These decades of instability and war 
decreased the literacy level dramatically and lack of education among the people is 
another factor of high level of corruption in the country. This situation creates a 
culture of corruption in which people believe that they should pay bribes in order to 
receive any basic social services from the governmental officers. Political corruption 
is result of people being easy on giving bribes and it grow in different layers of the 
government and create a system that bribery and misusing of the public resources is 
easy for the officials and in results the country experience cases like Kabul Bank that 
                                                        
3 Bentzen, J. How bad is corruption?, 2012. 
4 Adam J, Implementing anti corruption standards to improve Afghanistan’s 
education system, 2012. 
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many high level governmental officials were involved in misusing of millions of 
dollars from public money.  
 
Background of Corruption in Afghanistan: 
The levels of corruption in the country are extreme. According to a recent Asia 
Foundation study, in 2014, 62.4% of Afghans reported that corruption was a 
major problem in their daily life (see Figure 4), a significant increase from 2013 
(55.7%).15 Overall, perceptions of corruption as a major problem in daily life, 
people’s neighborhoods (53.3%), local authorities (59.9%), provincial 
governments (67.8%), and in Afghanistan as a whole (75.7%) have all risen since 
2013, as well as since the survey began tracking perceptions of corruption in 
2006. This is with the exception of the country as a whole, which polls at around 
the same, albeit high, level.5  
Corruption in Afghanistan during 2006-2014 
 
                                                        
5 Transparency International, Corruption, Lessons from the international mission in 
Afghanistan, July 2015 
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Perception of corruption in Afghanistan: 
 
Surveys of Afghan opinion repeatedly put corruption as the third biggest 
problem after insecurity and unemployment, with the notable exception of the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2010 survey that places it as 
Source: Integrity watch Afghanistan 
Source; UNODC 
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the biggest problem of Afghans. The Asia Foundation 2011 survey identifies 
corruption as the third biggest problem (21%) after insecurity (35%) and 
unemployment (23%). And it is again, for the second consecutive year, the 
second reason for pessimism of the respondents about Afghanistan (16% in 
2011 and 27% in 2010). Administrative corruption is perceived as the second 
most important failure (25%) of the government after insecurity (32%). This is a 
significant improvement over the results of the 2010 Asia Foundation survey, in 
which failure to fight corruption was tied, at 30%, with insecurity in being cited 
as the biggest failure of the Afghan government. Nonetheless, there is little 
change in citizen perceptions of their government actually tackling corruption, 
and the gap is striking between areas of perceived government success, such as 
education (85%) and poor perception of Afghan government success in fighting 
corruption (35%)6. 
 
Causes of corruption: 
Afghanistan has been home of homicide, war, ethical conflicts and 
playground of international and regional politics for more than 3 decades, 
which thrown the country to a deep chaotic and instable governmental 
system which is still fragile and full of bugs from different aspects.  People as 
the second threat to people always consider corruption after security in 
Afghanistan whenever they are asked to participate in a research and 
statistics do not show otherwise.  
Different factors and stakeholders cause corruption in Afghanistan: 
                                                        
6 Asia foundation, The Growing Challenge of Corruption in Afghanistan, 2012. 
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o Weak governmental system: The new government of Afghanistan has 
not been able to tackle the corruption very well and even the 
statistics shows increase in level of corruption by each year. 
Bureaucratic governmental style, lack of skillful and honest personnel 
and interference of warlords in the government made the 
government weak and unable to fight corruption.  
o Anti corruption efforts: Efforts are mostly not well studied and 
planned and do not reflect the real situation in the country. Most of 
these efforts end up establishing a new governmental body, which is 
increasing the bureaucracy as well as new channel for the corrupt 
individuals to misuse the system and get around it.  
o International community including UN agencies: These stakeholders 
are challenged to fight corruption in appose to their perceptions and 
model projects that they have implemented in other countries. This 
issue forces them to try different ways to tackle it but usually noon of 
them are being useful enough to decrease the level.  
17
Annex 1: Causes, forms and implication of corruption in Afghanistan- A Framework 
 
 
Chapter 3: Analysis of anti-corruption efforts 
 
- Prevention 
The government of Afghanistan included eliminating corruption as one of its main 
priorities in ANDS (Afghanistan National Development Strategy) and to reach that, 
different laws, strategies and policies have been created, designed and somehow 
implemented. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, defines prevention as an approach that:  
- Focuses on transparency and integrity, often without explicitly targeting 
corruption. This involves reform efforts in some of the core state functions 
such as revenue collection, allocation of resources and financial management. 
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Early improvements in public finance management, for instance, can be 
considered an important step toward prevention.7 
And recently the government of Afghanistan designed a 200-page strategy to fight 
corruption. This strategy, which is called “Strategy and Policy for Anti Corruption and 
Administrative Reform” is trying to show an idealistic image of government in each 
sector and what it should look like. But all of these and several other inter-ministerial 
or inter-sectorial policies toward fighting corruption, still have not worked and the 
level of corruption has increased, due to the following factors8:  
Rule of law is one of the main issues, since the government cannot or does not want 
to fight with high-level corrupt officials and this have caused some international 
supporters to look doubtfully on the government. In new US Strategy on Afghanistan 
it states: “Under a new anti-corruption strategy for Afghanistan, the U.S. 
government won't aggressively pursue top Afghan officials suspected of malfeasance, 
conceding that (limited judicial capacity and political interference) from President 
Hamid Karzai's government make success in prosecuting them unlikely.”9 This also 
affects the general population, since it will reduce their trust in the government. The 
UNODC survey shows that only 9% of Afghans reported corruption and others 
believe it is meaningless to report it since the government is not taking action.10. 
Existence of corruption inside the executive body of the state, reduced effects of 
efforts, especially when it comes to senior officials. Based on UNODC report, “ 25% 
                                                        
7 Gardizi, Corrupting the State or State-Crafted Corruption, 24. 
8 UNODC, Corruption in Afghanistan: As bribery reported by victims, 2012, Kabul. 
9 Warren P. Strobel and Marisa Taylor, “U.S. won't pursue Karzai allies in anti-
corruption campaign, “McClatchy Newspaper, January 6, 2011, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/06/106314/afghan-anti-corruption-
plan-sidesteps.html. 
10 UNODC, Corruption in Afghanistan: As bribery reported by victims, 2012, 
Kabul, 4. 
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of Afghans had to pay a bribe to police officers over the past year, 18% had to bribe 
a judge, and 13% a prosecutor.”11  
Furthermore policies are mostly idealistic with less consideration and analysis of the 
real problem, and lack of opportunities and resources to implement them makes 
these efforts less effective. In other hand, implementation of strategies and policies 
requires existence of resources, both human and financial; but both of these are 
affected by weaknesses in the country. Also there is less focus on the people’s side 
to engage them in efforts, (they are somehow ignored, because of existence of 
corruption networks inside the government). This means that people first do not 
report bribery and second, they even agree to pay it as a daily issue to get public 
service. A report released from Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), indicates that 
more than 70% of Afghans believe bribery is a normal way to do business with the 
state.12 
Preventions were mostly focused on the Afghan government, but not really on 
international stakeholders, who are operating inside Afghanistan, since there are 
proofs of corruption on contracts. FBI Special Agent Derek Boucher claimed in an 
interview that, ”… [in a ]meeting [that] took place at the Serena Hotel in Kabul. The 
senior construction manager made it clear he needed $190,000 in cash to award a 
U.S.-funded contract to build a school and a hospital in Afghanistan. He didn’t realize 
that the “subcontractor” he was talking to was really one of our undercover agents 
and that his bribe demand—including the acceptance of a $10,000 good-faith 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 
12 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Afghan perceptions and experiences of corruption: A 
2010 national survey, 2010, Kabul, 10. 
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payment—was being recorded on a hidden camera.”13 These kinds of experiences 
and lots of other cases in the research of IWA (Integrity Watch Afghanistan) or SIGAR 
(Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) shows that corruption 
should be prevented on both levels of national and international stakeholders. 
 
Commitment of Afghan government 
Part of Afghan leaders’ commitment in Bonn 1st in 2001 was to respect international 
conventions and establish a democrat transparent government which serves the 
people and is accountable in all layers of the governance. Afghanistan signed the 
United Nations convention against Administrative Corruption on 20 February 2004; 
Thus fighting corruption is one of the mandates for the government of Afghanistan, 
since it is mentioned in National strategy of High Office of Oversight Anti Corruption 
(HOO) that “ The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in its national and international 
commitments and also as a part of the international community, was included in 
United Nations Convention against administrative corruption and has joined in the 
struggle against administrative corruption14”, in addition President Karzai in 2006 
Based on article 50 of the Afghanistan constitution ordered fighting against 
administrative corruption and reforming as it is mentioned “ Based on the 
instruction of article 50 of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s constitution, in order 
to fight against administrative corruption and to create reform in the ministries, 
administrations and the governmental organization commission under the 
                                                        
13 Derek Boucher, Mission Afghanistan: Contract Corruption: Holding Americans 
Accountable in a War Zone, April 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/april 
/afghanistan_042611 
14 Strategy and Policy for Anti Corruption and Administrative 
Reform, High Office of Oversight, 2006. 
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leadership of Professor Abdul Salam Azimi the chief Justice and chief of the supreme 
court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and with participation of the Attorney 
General, Minister of Justice, Chief members of the Justice Commission, 
Administrative Reformers and the Commission of Parliamentary struggle against 
corruption and Senate Complaints commission, General Director of Administrative 
Affairs and Secretariat of Ministers Council, Director of Commission of 
Administrative reform and the Commission of Civil Services, General Independent 
Director of Struggle Against the Administrative Corruption and Bribery, the Adviser 
of the President in Financial Affairs and Evaluation control and the Deputy minister 
of Finance is approved.”15  
Additionally the president has issued numbers of decrees in this regard. For instance 
a letter issued from President Karzai’s office in January 2010 instructed all ministries 
to design strategies to eliminate corruption.  
Furthermore Afghanistan Constitution gives the obligation to the government in 
order to put efforts to fight corruption, hence in Article one of Anti Corruption Law it 
is mentioned; “The law has been enacted in the light of Article 50th and provision 
3rd of Article 75th of Afghanistan Constitution in order to regulate the affairs related 
to fight against bribery and corruption in all state administrations, state enterprises 
and cooperatives, private and non-governmental organizations that have dealings or 
contracts with government bodies.16” 
Hence the government of Afghanistan, is obliged to fight corruption and implement 
administrative reports based on their international as well as the national 
                                                        
15 Ibid. 
16 ibid. 
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commitments, and the loads of presidential decrees, strategies and policies shows 
that the government is forced by different stakeholders to show activities even 
though they were not effective enough to reduce it. For instance The Tokyo Mutual 
Accountability Framework, agreed to by the Afghan government and the 
international community, sets out the conditions by which Afghanistan will receive 
aid between 2012 and 2015. These conditions include increased transparency and 
accountability, and reduced corruption.17  
 
Commitment of International Community 
 
International community was the main supporter of Afghanistan in economy, politics 
as well as army and they have been invested billion of dollars since their arrival in 
Afghanistan in late 2001. NATO and other development aid donors in first Bonn 
conference in 2002 committed to support the government of Afghanistan to be 
democrat, transparent and efficient government and based on that they have 
invested hundreds millions of dollars to government structure, capacity building and 
administrative reforms.  The main areas that international community worked with 
Afghan government could be listed as; 
Organizational Development 
More than two decades of war in Afghanistan affected all the layer of government 
and vanished all the organizational structures; it specially happened during Taliban 
                                                        
17 Hamdam Shafiq, Afghanistan: From Commitment to Action; Atlantic-
Community.org , http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/afghanistan-from-
commitment-to-acti-1.  
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regime. International community had a huge impact on the new governmental 
structures; though we cannot reject that most of the processes are still paper based, 
slow and under control of huge bureaucracy, which is also giving room to corrupt 
groups to get more benefits.  
 
Capacity Building  
This is the most major focus point for the international stakeholders. Invested 
millions of dollars and conducted thousands of workshops, trainings or educational 
trips in order to improve capacity of governmental officials in national and local 
levels in different fields.  
 
Technical Supports 
Afghanistan is new to the technology world and only paper-based system is 
functioning in governmental organizations. One of the efforts by international 
community was and is to technically equip the government to function better and 
more efficient. So to reach this goal, a big amount of development funds during first 
years after Taliban era were invested in technical aspects of the government 
organizations.  
 
Consultancy 
 
High paid advisors and consultants hired by different donors such as USAID, DFID or 
UN are also part of strengthening the efficiency of the government which were 
effective for sometimes, but not a real deep influencer on affairs.  
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  Anti Corruption Strategies 
Corruptions represent a solemn warning to Afghanistan’s state-building and 
development programs. The serious threats include, in addition to depletion and loss 
of funds and public sector’s assets; distortion of government decisions and strategies; 
ineffectiveness of service delivery; unequal damage to the poor who can least afford 
to pay bribes; adverse effects on private sector; loss of government assets and 
revenue; and entrenchment of a criminal culture within the government (including 
buying and selling of governmental positions).18 
In spite of strong statements against corruption by governmental bureaucrats, little 
tangible evolution has been achieved in combat against corruption. The argument 
used to be that the institutional environment for combating corruption in 
Afghanistan is characterized by “a lack of clear policy support, explicit legal 
frameworks”19 
More generally, “A number of separate, overlapping, and to some extent competing 
government anti-corruption documents are in circulation (including the Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy’s anticorruption document, the anti-corruption 
roadmap paper, and others), which leads to risk of confusion and lack of broad 
ownership of a clear anti-corruption agenda”20.  
                                                        
18 Corruption in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
19 ibid. 
20 World Bank,: Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: Summaries of vulnerabilities 
to corruption Assessments. Washington DC, 2009. P2 
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The government of Afghanistan has developed their Anti Corruption strategy called 
“Strategy and Policy for Anti Corruption and Administrative Reform” in 2006 based 
on the mandates included in their commitment through signing of United Nations 
Convention against Administrative Corruption.  
This strategy is generally focusing on the problems existed and a giving broad 
recommendation points on solving the problems. Problems and their 
recommendations are categorized as follow:  
Lack of existence of a proper personnel structure (Tashkil) according to the needs 
of administration  
War and two decades of conflicts mentioned as the main reason behind lack of the 
proper personnel structure and outlined that: “For the time being, Afghanistan has 
spent years at war, destruction, demolition and needs reconstruction; the current 
structure and administrative systems are old and have a nepotism style that cannot 
organize or provide public services as per the current situation. In addition, the 
assignment of persons and employees has no rational and appropriate basis which 
has caused further corruption and disorder.21” And the reasons behind this point is 
names as follow: 
Structural expansion and reduction  
Afghanistan is suffering from huge number of employees in organizations 
that need less number of them and it added to the problem of “ghost 
employees”. This strategy is analyzing the situation and gives a very general 
solution for the problem existed. For instance in one of the 
                                                        
21  Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan; Strategy and Policy for Anti Corruption and 
Administrative Reform. 2006, 12p 
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recommendations to solve this problem is came as “- A supervising 
independent administration on implementing this strategy should be 
established as a temporary project to revise organizational structures of 
ministries, independent budget administrations and all governmental 
organizations with the participation of their related administrations and 
present their specific suggestions in accordance with the work necessities of 
government.22”, And given 3 months to implement this recommendation. But 
as mentioned above, it is a broad recommendation that is in lack of 
specifications as well as logical time frame. Other recommendations 
mentioned are also having the same problems.   
Delay in Structure (Tashkil) implementation  
Government structure is always a challenge in Afghanistan and has been 
under influence of personal choice. It is mentioned in the strategy that 
government entities are yet (late 2006) to submit their Tashkil list and the 
requirement for it. And It has been given two weeks for the ministries to send 
their list of organizational structures from main office and all their 34 
provincial offices, which makes it doubtful. 
Furthermore it will not be strange to see a new established governmental 
department today and or elimination of another one. It will not be 
exaggeration to underline weak decisions of the government over the 
structures as one of the corruption causes23.  
                                                        
22 ibid. 
23 Zakeri, Jaffar. Fragile Tashkil of Afghanistan, 2013.  
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Complicated and lengthy performances 
This problem is mentioned as “Lengthy and complicated performances, 
referring clients to different offices, getting unnecessary signatures in 
applications, papers or document and recording unnecessary letters became 
customary in administrations.” In this strategy, passport procedure is named 
as the clear example of it. “But unfortunately the problem is still existed after 
eight years from development of this strategy and yet to find a solution for 
that”24. In a research published by United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 
(UNODC) on October 201325, it shows that bribery is existed among the half 
of government officials working for birth certificate and or passport 
departments and its prevalence in mentioned departments is fourth after 
application or social security, construction bidding and land registration 
(figure 1). And at the same researched it is outlined that at least around 20% 
of the applicants paid bribe in 2012 to get the service for passport of birth 
certificate26. Jawed Nader writes in his paper about Afghanistan that:” Such 
deep-seated pity bribes corrupt the opinions of people about public sector 
services undermining their faith in public sector. It also sets the stage for 
greater malpractices such as ‘officials overspending, profiteering from public 
procurement, nepotism, clientelism, favouritism…’ and even nastier ones 
such as ‘de facto takeover of state institutions, undermining elections, 
                                                        
24 Ibid. 
25 UNODC, Corruption in Afghanistan: recent patterns and integrity challenges  
.in public sector. October 2013, p32. 
26 Ibid. 
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corruption of the judicial process and media … If citizens show zero tolerance 
to these bribes, how can governments play foul with their votes!27”  
 
Analytical Review of the strategies, 
Reviewing of the strategies that the Afghan Government has designed in the 
period of 2003 till 2014 will give you a long list of national and local strategies 
that has been designed, tested and or still being implemented. National anti 
corruption strategy and HOO anti corruption strategy are the two main ones that 
have been in focus point for several years.   
  
What has been missed? 
To design strategies in order to reduce corruption and condense it, there should 
be three different methods:  
 
- A. Policy change: It raises the cost and price of corruption through sanctions 
and external monitoring; with formulating systems have provoke self-
restraint within government organizations. Corruption can only occur when 
government actors have prudence over the use of resources or the nuisance 
of costs on private actors. If the policies and programs that give rise to this 
prudence are themselves eliminated, the particular forms of corruption 
related with them inevitably vanish. While plans such as significance 
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licensing, finance loans and government commercial activity are productive 
soil for corruption, a deregulatory key nevertheless has some limitations. 
First, corruption can undermine the implementation of certain types of 
deregulatory policy: import tariffs, for example, may be abolished but 
unofficial levies may still be imposed. Second, the prescription to deregulate 
may be politically naïve - as in Afghanistan – powerful actors have an interest 
in economic controls and the opportunities for corruption that they generate. 
Third, getting rid of the scope for discretion among government actors is 
frequently undesirable: many forms of guideline have sound economic and 
social. Privatization, for example, may simply open28 
- B. The second kind in which anti-corruption strategies fall is that of resolving 
the principal-agent problem that underlies corruption by imposing peripheral 
and external restriction on government actors. Democracy as an external 
constraint mechanism is, however, potentially hindered by collective action 
problems and political corruption. And the “rule of law”- meaning, at a 
minimum, a political system in which the government obeys its own laws and 
applies them consistently, without regard to the identity or power of 
particular individuals-is a complex institution29. 
- C. The last sort of anti-corruption strategy to recreate and the institutions 
within the government in a way that support the national strategy and the 
real mandates of the government. And to support and give enough support 
on those institutions that become powerful enough to fight corruption in all 
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29Ibid. 
30
the levels. In Afghanistan; government created different institutions and 
designed various strategies but have not support them in a way that be 
efficient. "The current approach is not tenable," said an administration 
official who, like others interviewed, agreed to discuss internal deliberations 
only on the condition of anonymity. "What will we get out of it? We'll arrest a 
few mid-level Afghans, but we'll lose our ability to operate there and achieve 
our principal goals.30"  
Sanction 
The sanctions-based approach is intimately linked to the establishment of 
specialized anti-corruption bodies.31 And the government of Afghanistan was not 
pessimistic on this, as they established various institutions to solve the problem, 
which resulted poor outcomes. From 2004 until now, six institutions are established 
to fight corruption and bring reforms in government structures, but these anti-
corruption institutions were either part of corrupt groups or couldn’t do anything 
outstanding. For instance, the ex-president of the High Office of Oversight Anti-
Corruption, Mr. Azizullah Vasifi indicates in a report published by Kalid group that, 
most anti corruption efforts are to cheat public opinion; otherwise nothing is 
happening in practice.32  There could be many reasons behind weak functions of 
these institutions that are shortly mentioned below: 
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- Government is mostly focused on size and numbers of institutions, rather 
than effectiveness.  
- One of these institutions’ outcomes was that they designed policies in which 
establishment of high a level salary scale for seniors is recommended, but in 
result it created a huge gap between incomes, and encouraged low level 
employees to ask for bribery in order to equalize this gap. Fighting corruption 
could be analyzed more properly rather than creating high-level salaries for a 
group and discriminating other middle or low-level staffs. 
- There is less trust in anti-corruption institutions among the people and this 
causes many people not to cooperate with them and also not to have enough 
trust in their works. For instance a report published in early October this year 
indicates that three HOO staff that were in a mission to Hirat (in the west of 
Afghanistan) municipality, were arrested for a sexual harassment scandal. Or 
lately parliament had a media argument with the head of HOO and was 
accusing him for being involved in corruption.33 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Although corruption in Afghanistan cannot be eliminated overnight, it could be 
significantly reduced, and even modest improvements in public accountability 
will substantially enhance the legitimacy of the new government. As Afghanistan 
seeks to stand on its own, the national unity government cannot afford to appear 
indifferent to the anger many Afghans feel toward an entrenched elite widely 
perceived to be motivated more by greed than by a spirit of public service34.   
The new government of Afghanistan should put fighting corruption as a core 
effort and a goal to be achieved with a long-term vision through visionary and 
SMART policies, institution and strategies.  
 
-The government should be clear and concise in their message:   
The new government should show the people that they are serious on having a 
transparency within the government and they will not stop fighting corruption. 
The Political will is essential to fight corruption. It would carry even more 
meaning if it were tied to enforceable provisions in Afghanistan law such as anti-
bribery measures and anti-money laundering statutes. An integrity pledge could 
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help to restore some level of faith in the elected officials and begin the process of 
rebuilding the government’s reputation. Furthermore, top-level action will signal 
to lower-level officials and civil servants that anticorruption efforts will be taken 
seriously in the national unity government35. 
-Fighting money laundering and financial terrorism:  
Afghan officials should prioritize efforts to create an effective system to combat 
money laundering and terrorism finance. The new government must prioritize 
legislation to effectively criminalize money laundering and terrorist financing; to 
create a legal framework for identifying, tracing, and freezing terrorist financing; 
and to establish and implement broad procedures for the confiscation of assets 
related to corruption and money laundering36.  
 
-Participation of the civil society: 
Number of domestic and international civil-society organizations in Afghanistan 
grew vastly in last decade and they are working on behalf of Afghan people. Civil-
society works a watchdog for the interest of the public and have they ability to 
check the efforts of government on fighting corruption.  Afghanistan leaders 
should consider recognizing the power of the civil-society and creating an 
environment that they take a part as a stakeholder in fighting corruption.  
 
-Modernize the efforts 
                                                        
35 Ibid. 
36 ibid. 
34
Technology can be as a strong tool to fight corruption. Modernizing the public 
system, taxation, electronic IDs and … can bring a boost in fighting corruption 
and it will give a moral support for the population to be part of the effort.  
Honest government will only come about when ordinary citizens demand it. 
Afghan citizens want to see change and technology could provide a huge boost to 
anticorruption efforts in the country.  
- Identify ways the United States and international community can assist 
anticorruption efforts 
The United States and the international donor community should encourage and 
support Afghanistan in its efforts to effectively take on the challenge of 
corruption while maintaining realistic expectations about the likely pace of 
progress. It is critically important that leadership of the fight against corruption 
remains firmly in the Afghan government’s hands, with strong support from 
international partners. Efforts are needed create a high-level and public dialogue 
on corruption and the continuation of technical assistance and capacity building 
is essential. However, the international community could better coordinate 
assistance to ensure that all needs are addressed and that multiple donors are 
not providing repetitive, or even contradictory, advice on measures to be taken 
in the fight against corruption37. 
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Chapter 5: Indexes and Figures 
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